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Abstract
There are two varieties of timing games in economics: Having more predecessors
helps in a war of attrition and hurts in a pre-emption game. This paper introduces
and explores a spanning class with rank-order payoﬀs that subsumes both as special
cases. We assume a continuous time setting with unobserved actions and complete
information, and explore how equilibria of these games capture many economic and
social timing phenomena — shifting between phases of slow and explosive (positive
probability) stopping.
Inspired by auction theory, we ﬁrst show how the symmetric Nash equilibria are
each equivalent to a diﬀerent “potential function”. This device straightforwardly
yields existence and characterization results. The Descartes Rule of Signs, e.g.,
bounds the number phase transitions. We describe how adjacent timing game phases
interact: War of attrition phases are not played out as long as they would be in
isolation, but instead are cut short by pre-emptive atoms. We bound the number
of equilibria, and compute the payoﬀ and duration of each equilibrium.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C73, D81.
Keywords: Games of Timing, War of Attrition, Preemption Game.
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Timing models in economics fall into one of two opposing camps. In the ﬁrst, delay is
exogenously costly, and each player prefers that others act before him; we categorize this
tentatively as a war of attrition. In the second, the situation is reversed, where the passage
of time is exogenously beneﬁcial, and players wish to pre-empt others; this is usually
classiﬁed as a pre-emption game. There are, however, many important strategic situations
where players prefer to be neither ﬁrst nor last (ﬁxing the exogenous environment). This
class oﬀers many new behavioral phenomena — like multiple periods of slow stopping
interspersed with sudden rushes. The goal of this paper is to develop a foundation for a
spanning class of timing games without restrictions on rank order payoﬀs.
We develop a comprehensive theory for complete information timing games with ex-
ogenous delay costs1 and assume that the rewards depend on the players’ ordinal stopping
ranks. These rank rewards should be seen as a reduced form for a richer model, so that one
can focus on the essence of the two strategic forces in timing games. The ﬁrst force arises
in a (many-player) war of attrition, where the early stoppers earn less than later ones, so
that players prefer a higher ordinal stopping rank. The opposing second force is found
in a pre-emption game, where people prefer a lower ordinal rank. In either case, rewards
are monotonic in the ordinal stopping ranks. Our formulation extends to non-monotonic
rank-rewards.
We also assume unobservable actions; this is a necessary tractability assumption,
allowing us to use Nash equilibrium, and thereby adapt ‘potential functions’ and borrow
insights from mechanism design. “Silent timing games” capture economic environments
where timing decisions must be made well before the action begins — as with high-tech
market entry decisions, or choosing release dates for movies. We also posit discounting and
known delay costs. As in most timing game papers, we focus on symmetric equilibria in
mixed strategies. This captures an anonymity of play natural in many contexts. We also
exclude strategies explicitly depending on focal calendar times or random coordination
devices like sunspots.
Our aim is to ﬁnd and characterize all the equilibria in this class, and we proceed in
two steps. First, we argue that the core elements of our game, the rank payoﬀs, are fully
and uniquely encoded in a function Φ. This mapping corresponds to a thought experiment
in which all players employ some identical atomless strategy.
The second step is to establish that every equilibrium of the game is equivalent to
1Exogenous payoﬀ growth over time, a feature often associated with pure pre-emption games, is an
obvious extension that we pursue in other work.
1 Caller Number Fivea unique convexiﬁcation of the function Φ, which we call potential functions. The key
advantage of this reformulation is that important qualitative features of behavior in an
equilibrium can then easily be derived from properties of the corresponding potential
function. The idea behind the convexiﬁcation procedure is that if later ranks secure less
valuable rewards than earlier ranks, then atoms endogenously arise in equilibrium to make
the costly delay worthwhile. Such atoms guarantee that a player obtains both large and
small rank-payoﬀs with positive-probability, thereby “ironing” players’ equilibrium rank-
order payoﬀs. And an ironed portion of players’ rank payoﬀs corresponds to a convexiﬁed
portion of the representing function Φ.
Such convexiﬁcations have many uses in economics (originally, auctions) and the sci-
ences, but in the spirit of all such applications, their gradient yields equilibrium expected
payoﬀs (see footnote 11).2 One example of a potential function is the convex hull of the
function Φ. Since it always exists, this yields an immediate proof that a symmetric Nash
equilibrium exists (Theorem 1). Myerson (1981) was the ﬁrst to adopt the notion of an
“ironing board”. His function was the maximum revenue auction and thus the convex hull
of an integrated marginal revenue function. By contrast, we desire all Nash equilibria,
and therefore explore a local convexiﬁcation notion. The convex hull corresponds to the
equilibrium with the highest payoﬀ loss due to delay. Our equilibrium characterization
reduces to analyzing all possible potential functions.
To illustrate the equilibrium behavior, consider now the following example: Suppose
that a radio call-in show awards Stones tickets to the seventy-seventh caller. If the number
of other potential callers is known, and if waiting to call inﬂicts opportunity costs on
listeners, when should they call? Intuitively, players initially strategically beneﬁt from
the delay, but eventually succumb to a fear of missing out. How long will the game last?
What economic lessons can be gleaned from players’ equilibrium timing behavior?
One might well imagine that players wait to call, and suddenly call en masse, jamming
the phone lines. The prediction of our model is more subtle. Since delaying is explicitly
costly, agents are initially locked in a war of attrition. Everyone adopts a mixed strategy,
and the chance of winning is ever increasing. Ideally each wants to call when the probability
that seventy-six have called is maximal. At that moment, everyone else would do likewise,
triggering explosive calling — which we refer to as a stopping atom. But the story does
not end there. Only one caller can win, so that the value of the expected prize is lower
compared to a situation where one is the only caller. The pre-emption moment is thus
pushed earlier in time until everyone is indiﬀerent between pre-empting the atom and
2Another example is a recent paper by Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2006), who use a convexiﬁcation
technique to describe players’ synchronization behavior under uncertainty.
2 Caller Number Fivecalling with the mass. Thus, the pre-emption atom ‘prematurely’ truncates the war of
attrition phase: Relative to the direct sum of equilibria from two timing games,3 agents
pre-empt earlier and do so with an excessively large mass. In our paper, both time and
size of explosive stopping moments are endogenous.
The motivational radio show example aside, our paper matches some other economic
applications. For instance, entry into a growing potential new market is often most
proﬁtable for early ﬁrms after the leader — who struggle with neither market creation nor
brand identiﬁcation. The social phenomenon of fashionable lateness bespeaks a preference
for a middling arrival rank. In rush hour one seeks to be early or late.
Moving on to characterizing the equilibria, we ﬁrst note that a war of attrition phase
obtains only for rising expected payoﬀs — when strategic and exogenous delay costs
conﬂict. Pre-emptive behaviour is likewise mandated when expected rank payoﬀs fall.
So the slope sign changes of expected payoﬀs are key. Theorem 2 bounds the number of
phases transitions by the underlying deterministic rank reward using the Descartes Rule
of Signs; this provides a simple upper bound on the number of phase transitions and it
binds for some equilibria.
With ever-increasing costs pre-emptive behavior is synonymous to a positive-probability
of stopping in an atom. A switch from a gradual war of attrition phase to a pre-emptive
atom (or back) can only occur if expected rank payoﬀs and atomic payoﬀ before and after
(or conversely) coincide. We then show that non-atomic rank and atomic rewards relate
as do marginals and averages (Lemma 2). We build on this insight to deduce that any
war of attrition phase ends before expected rank payoﬀs peak and, following an atom,
any war of attrition starts after rank payoﬀs trough (Theorem 3). For this reason, we say
that the war is ‘truncated’ and the atom is ‘inﬂated’.
We then determine how many equilibria the game may have. Since wars of attrition
and pre-emption games alternate, and thus are bundled, the question is which consecutive
pairs are played. The number of equilibria is then found by simple combinatorics: With J
matched pairs of wars of attrition and pre-emption games, there are 2J potential Nash
equilibria (Theorem 4).
In the war of attrition, all rents — namely, the greatest minus the least expected rank
payoﬀ — are dissipated. This is not true when rank order payoﬀs are non-monotonic. As
a result, the pre-emption games start when expected rank payoﬀs coincide with average
atomic payoﬀs, before the former peaks; thus, the maximal expected rank payoﬀ is not
3In such a direct sum of equilibria, one would merely combine the equilibrium for the war of attrition,
which would be played for as long as possible, with the pre-emptive atom that is just large enough so
that decreasing rank payoﬀs are bunched together.
3 Caller Number Fiveattained in equilibrium. Theorem 5 instead shows that the maximal payoﬀ dissipation
in the game is captured not by a diﬀerence of expected rank payoﬀs, but by a diﬀerence
of the greatest backward average payoﬀ and the least forward average payoﬀ. Also, the
game’s expected payoﬀ is at least the minimum of the forward average payoﬀs. This
contrasts with the war of attrition, where the value is the least expected rank payoﬀ.
Our analysis yields a separation of rank payoﬀs and time costs. Since costs play a key
role in determining equilibrium strategies, one might think that not much can be said
about the equilibrium without specifying the strategies. Yet the equilibrium is based on
the potential function. And this function is derived from the primitive rank payoﬀs alone,
thus determining an equilibrium for any time costs.
We conclude by brieﬂy considering observable actions. This produces multiple infor-
mation sets and vastly enriches the set of supportable equilibria (now subgame perfect).
Still, we brieﬂy argue that our main qualitative insight about atom inﬂation and war of
attrition truncation from Theorem 3 remains applicable with a simple reﬁnement.
Maynard Smith (1974) ﬁrst formalized the war of attrition for theoretical biology:
Two animals ﬁght over a fallen prey, the ﬁrst to give up loses, and ﬁghting is costly
for both. With multiple players, payoﬀs are increasing in the stopping rank. Hendricks,
Weiss, and Wilson (1988) have characterized continuous time complete information war of
attrition-equilibria, while Bulow and Klemperer (1999) analyzed a generalized N-player
war of attrition with incomplete information. Abreu and Pearce (2006) have applied wars
of attrition to bargaining. All-pay auctions and all-pay contests have a similar ﬂavor as
only the last few/highest bids obtain the price; see Siegel (2007) for a recent insightful
paper.
The pre-emption game has also been studied widely. Early work focused on tactical
duels4 — two player zero-sum timing games played on a compact time-interval. Two
duelists shoot at each other with accuracy increasing in proximity, and they may or
may not observe the other’s shot. Modern economic examples are aptly captured by the
‘Grab-the-Dollar’ game: A player can either grab the money on the table or wait for one
more period; meanwhile, the pot increases by one unit. Players want to be the ﬁrst to
take the money, but would rather grab a larger pot. Recent examples are Abreu and
Brunnermeier (2003), who model ﬁnancial bubbles (also with unobserved actions), Levin
and Peck (2003, 2005) who look at market entry, and Bouis, Huisman, and Kort (2006)
and Argenziano and Schmidt-Dengler (2006) who study N-player investment dynamics.
In independent work, Sahuguet (2006) explores the equilibria of a three player timing
4In 1949, the RAND Corporation kick-started the study of duels (silent timing games) with a confer-
ence with leading economists, statisticians, and economists — for an extensive survey see Karlin (1959).
4 Caller Number Fivegame with both pre-emption and attrition features. His payoﬀs are not rank-dependent.
In a recent paper, Laraki, Solan, and Vieille (2005) (LSV) study the existence of equilibria
in general timing games; they provide a very compelling argument for the existence of an
ǫ-equilibrium in two-person timing game, and an existence argument for two other classes
(cumulative and symmetric, as deﬁned in their paper); these existence results, however, do
not overlap with our general existence and characterization theorems.5 Amidst this large
literature on timing games, we believe that, our respective works are the ﬁrst that provide
a systematic treatment of classes of games that are neither just a pre-emption game nor
just a war of attrition. We hope that our analysis suggests a wider and richer application
of timing games in economics.6 Our work oﬀers insight into periodic unexpected rushes
of uncertain size, followed by relative quiet.
Overview. In Sections 2 and 3, we outline the model, and derive the potential
function notion for the equilibrium analysis. In Section 4, we bound the numbers of
equilibria and phase transitions, and show how wars of attrition are truncated and pre-
emptive atoms inﬂated in equilibrium. Section 5 bounds the payoﬀs and game durations
of our equilibria. Section 6 discusses the results and potential extensions. Appendix A
lays out the equilibrium analysis for observable actions, Appendix B discusses other Nash
equilibria that we do not consider in the main text and Appendix C contains proofs of
several lemmata that are used in the main text.
2 A Model of Timing Games with Rank-Dependent Payoﬀs
Players. There are N + 1 ≥ 2 identical players.
Strategies. Play transpires in continuous time, starting at time t = 0. Players have
to decide whether ‘to stop’ or ‘not to stop’; they may stop only once; a stopping decision
is irrevocable. Actions are unobservable.
With unobservable actions, there is only one information set. A player’s strategy
speciﬁes when he will stop. A mixed strategy is a non-decreasing and right-continuous
cumulative distribution function (cdf) G : [0,∞) → [0,1], whose interpretation is that a
player stops with probability G(t) by time t or before.
5Our existence results are not subsumed by LSV. Their Theorem 1.2 assumes two players. LSV have
other existence results for more than two players, but none applies to our model: Our payoﬀs are not
cumulative (Theorem 1.3), nor symmetric (as deﬁned by LSV, Theorem 1.4). Their Theorem 1.5, which
may admit ordinal rank-payoﬀs, requires no time costs or discounting; Also, it secures existence of a Nash
equilibrium only if an ǫ-equilibrium exists (which would thus need to be proven separately) for every ǫ.
6Shinkai (2000) developed a three-player Stackelberg-type game that ﬁts our rank-payoﬀ formulation:
In his framework, quantity pre-emption and learning from predecessors’ choices interact to eﬀectively
form U-shaped rank rewards. Shinkai, however, does not model the timing decision explicitly.
































Figure 1: Plots of rewards structures. Left Panel: A stylized War of Attrition reward structure
(gray, higher ranks yield higher rewards), and a stylized pre-emption game reward structure (black, low
ranks are better). Middle Panel: Hill-shaped reward structure (gray, the some middle rank is best), and
an ‘avoid-the-crowd’ U-shaped reward structure (black, either a very low or very high rank is best). Right
Panel: Two general reward structures with multiple hills: there are multiple ‘locally’ optimal ranks.
Payoﬀs. Upon stopping, a player receives a lump-sum reward that depends on his
ordinal stopping rank. This payment is captured in the reward-function v:{1,...,N+1} →
R+. For instance, in a two-player war of attrition, v(1) = 0 and the prize is v(2) > 0.
In the Caller Number Five game, v(k) = 0 for all k  = 5, and the prize is v(5) > 0.
In general, having more predecessors helps in a war of attrition— or v(k) < v(k + 1) for
all k. In a pre-emption game, the situation is reversed, as having more predecessors hurts,
or v(k) ≥ v(k + 1) for all k. See Figure 1 for various rank-reward structures.
Agents who stop at the same time equally share the respective rank rewards. This
reﬂects that players are anonymous and identical and that players don’t control their
rank order among simultaneous stoppers.7 Assume then that k ∈ {0,...,N} players
have stopped, and j + 1 ∈ {1,...,N − k + 1} players stop together. Then the atomic
rewards are the average rank reward A(k,j) := (v(k + 1) +     + v(k + j + 1))/(j + 1).
For instance, in a war of attrition, if both agents stop immediately, then their order is
randomly determined, and they share the prize equally.
There are two types of explicit costs: Discounting at the interest rate r ≥ 0, and
exogenous participation costs c(t), with c(0) = 0, ˙ c > 0, and limt→∞ c(t) = ∞.8
Equilibrium. Players are ex ante identical and anonymous. It is then intuitive to
explore symmetric strategy Nash equilibria. To avoid a continuum of arbitrary outcomes,
we conﬁne attention to equilibria whose cdf G has convex support starting at 0. (The
support of G is the set of all t with G(t+ε)−G(t−ε) > 0 for all ε > 0.) To summarize:
E1: The support of G is a connected interval [0,T] or [0,∞).
This restriction is designed to preclude equilibria with explicit periods of silence due to
unspeciﬁed reasons — calendar time or random holidays (sunspots). But we argue in the
7Alternatively, imagine that stoppers are randomly assigned one of the respective rank payoﬀs.
8In a related work, we also explore time beneﬁts.
6 Caller Number Fivepaper that it actually embodies a much stronger stationarity assumption. Appendix B
later proves that a continuum of equilibria arises absent this assumption.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we outline several tools used in equilibrium analysis: necessary conditions
for mixed strategies, atomic stopping, potential functions, and general existence.
3.1 First Order Conditions for Continuous Strategies
Consider a symmetric, continuous strategy G(t). If G(t) = g,9 then the expected payoﬀ










N−kv(k + 1). (1)
The function φ does not depend on the equilibrium and is a primitive of the game. Specif-
ically, not only do the rank payoﬀs uniquely determine φ, but we can uniquely deduce the





gk(1−g)N−k are orthogonal and thus form a basis for the degree-N polynomials
(see, for instance, Milovanovic, Mitrinovic, and Rassias (1994)). In other words, given
the coeﬃcients v(1),...,v(N + 1), there is a unique expression φ and given φ, there are
unique coeﬃcients v(1),...,v(N + 1).
In any mixed strategy equilibrium, an agent must be indiﬀerent about stopping any-
where strictly inside the support, so that expected payoﬀs are constant. Payoﬀs are
discounted rewards less discounted costs,
e
−rt[φ(G(t)) − c(t)]. (2)
Assume ˙ G(t) exists. Then in equilibrium, payoﬀs are constant, and equating the marginal
exogenous costs and marginal strategic gains from delay, we get:
˙ c + r (φ(G) − c) = ˙ Gφ′(G) (3)
The function G(t) measures the probability that a player has stopped by time t, and
so is non-decreasing. For a continuous and increasing G, the diﬀerential equation (3)
implies that ˙ c + r(φ(G) − c) and φ′(G) have the same sign. Now, ˙ c > 0 and r ≥ 0. Also,
9In what follows we will use g for realizations of G(t) and we will use ˙ G to denote the derivative of G(t)
(when it exists).
7 Caller Number Fiveφ(G(t)) ≥ c(t), for otherwise, players would always be better oﬀ stopping at time 0 to get
the non-negative rank rewards v ≥ 0. So (3) is solvable only if φ′(G) > 0. In summary,
the delay cost must be oﬀset by a strategic delay incentive — so that advancing in the
ranks yields greater payoﬀs and compensates for the requisite delay.
Lemma 1 (The Structure of Equilibria) Any Nash equilibrium is described by a cdf G
consisting solely of atomic jumps and intervals on which G is continuously diﬀerentiable.
While a cdf is monotone, and thus almost everywhere diﬀerentiable, the jumps may
be dense in (0,1) (maybe the rationals), and there may be non-jump points where G is
not diﬀerentiable. Lemma 1, whose proof is in the appendix, rules out both possibilities.
3.2 Analogy for Atomic Rewards: Average vs. Marginal Revenue
Consider one player and suppose that the other N players, acting independently, have
stopped with probability G(t) = g by time t. At this time, each of the remaining players
stops with probability h − g, where h > g. We often refer to h − g as the atom or mass.
Then the probability that players of ranks k+1,...,k+j stop at time t equals a trinomial
coeﬃcient N!/k!j!(N −k −j)! times gk(h−g)j(1−h)N−k−j. The expected payoﬀ in this












Thus, Λ(0,h) is the payoﬀ of an initial atom of size h, and Λ(g,1) the payoﬀ of a terminal
atom of size 1−g. When 0 < g < h < 1, Λ(g,h) is the average payoﬀ in the interior atom
from g to h. Denote by Φ(g) :=
R g
0 φ(s)ds the anti-derivative of φ(g). This motivates:
Lemma 2 Φ(h) − Φ(g) = (h − g)Λ(g,h).
The algebraic details of this proof are delegated to the appendix. The intuition is the
following: Independently place each of the N other players into the stopped, atom, and
remaining groups, with respective weights (g,h − g,1 − h). The expected average rank
payoﬀ in the ‘atom’ group is then (Φ(h) − Φ(g))/(h − g), by deﬁnition of a conditional
expectation. But this is how we have deﬁned Λ(g,h), and so these measures coincide.
This has a nice illustrative analogue in standard producer theory: When AR and
MR denote average and marginal revenue, and q is quantity, then MR − AR = qAR
′(q).
Diﬀerentiating Lemma 2 w.r.t. h directly yields φ(h) − Λ(g,h) = (h − g) ∂
∂hΛ(g,h). This
admits an analogous interpretation: h − g is the mass of the atom, and corresponds to
8 Caller Number Fivethe quantity. The expectation Λ(g,h) aggregates and averages rewards, and φ(h) is the
derivative of aggregated (non-averaged) rewards. Lemma 2 thus implies that φ( ) crosses
Λ(g, ) from above at the local interior maxima of Λ, and from below at the minima.
Since we can deduce Φ from φ, and vice versa, Φ is a primitive of the game too, and
suﬃces to uniquely identify the rank payoﬀs. We henceforth identify the game by Φ.
3.3 Equilibrium, Potential Functions, and Existence
We have already speciﬁed that we only consider right-continuous cdfs G : [0,∞) → [0,1]
for symmetric Nash equilibria that have convex support, including 0 (labeled as (E1) in
Section 2). In any equilibrium, net payoﬀs are constant along the support of play, and
there is no strict incentive to out-wait all other players. Conversely, these are suﬃcient
conditions for a Nash equilibrium. An equilibrium is formally a cdf obeying:
E2: e−rt[φ(G(t))−c(t)] is the same constant for all times in the support of G with G(t) < 1;
E3: If G(t∗)>G(t∗−), then φ(G(t∗−))=Λ(G(t∗−),G(t∗))≥φ(G(t∗)) (equal if G(t∗)<1).
Since G is a cdf, it jumps at most countably many times, and is continuous on the
intervening intervals.10 By Lemma 1, any continuous portion of G is diﬀerentiable. To
ﬁnd an equilibrium cdf G(t), we thus solve the diﬀerential equation (3) subject to the
right boundary conditions, determine atomic jumps so that (E3) holds, and then ensure
that the boundary conditions reﬂect the atomic jumps.
We now develop an alternative representation of equilibrium in a single function. This
re-formulation will simplify our later analysis of the timing games ﬁrst of all by aﬀording
a short proof of existence. More generally, in lieu of a potentially lengthy, complex, and
ad hoc equilibrium analysis (like computing the number of equilibria and equilibrium
payoﬀs), we show how it suﬃces to analyze a scalar function.
A C2 function Γ : [0,1] → R+ induces a strategy G for Φ if
• ˙ G = (˙ c + r[Γ′(G) − c])/Γ′′(G) whenever Γ(G(t)) = Φ(G(t)),
• if Γ  = Φ on an interval (g,h), then G( ) jumps from g to h.
We then deﬁne as follows: The function Γ : [0,1] → R+ is a potential function11 w.r.t. Φ
10We deduce later on that there can only be ﬁnitely many jumps.
11 Our phrase “potential function” is in the spirit of a harmonic function whose derivatives describe
the gradient on a conservative vector ﬁeld. Closest to our work, in Myerson (1981), the convex hull
of integrated “virtual valuations” for the auction is a potential function; its derivatives ﬁx the priority
level for allocating the good. Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) may be the ﬁrst to use the phrase “potential
function” in game theory; diﬀerences of their potential function yielded marginal payoﬀ contributions
in a transferable utility game. Our concept bears no relation to the “potential games” literature — eg.,
the potential function in Monderer and Shapley (1996) is a function of the vector of quantities in an IO
game. Our potential function maps from a scalar probability.
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P1: Γ(0) = 0, Γ(1) = Φ(1), and Γ′(1) ≥ Φ′(1);
P2: Γ is monotonically increasing, convex, and continuously diﬀerentiable;
P3: At each x ∈ (0,1), either Γ(x) = Φ(x), or Γ is linear in an open interval around x.
The next lemma uniquely identiﬁes potential functions Γ and the equilibria of the game Φ.
Before stating the formal result, we provide a couple few basic identities for Φ. First,
























In other words, Γ(1) is the average rank payoﬀ by (P1), while Γ′(1) ≥ φ(1) = v(N + 1).
Lemma 3 (Equivalence) Fix Φ. Any potential function Γ induces a unique equilibrium
cdf G, and any equilibrium cdf G is induced by a unique potential function Γ.
The proof is in the appendix. In brief, ﬁx a potential function Γ. Diﬀerentiating Γ
yields the expected rank payoﬀs for any probability g, which are needed for the under-
lying diﬀerential equation of the induced equilibrium. At g = 0, this determines the
constant payoﬀ for the induced equilibrium. Then, as time costs increase, rank payoﬀs
must increase which is ensured by convexity. Linear segments in the potential function
correspond to atomic stopping, whose payoﬀs are given by the slope of the corresponding
linear segment. Since Φ, the anti-derivative of φ, is a polynomial, it is arbitrarily smooth;
since Γ is continuously diﬀerentiable and smooth and either coincides with Φ or is linear,
at the join between a smooth and a linear segment the slopes of the smooth and the linear
part coincide. Thus the payoﬀs from the corresponding atom and the payoﬀs from slow
play before and after the atom coincide.
Conversely, a potential function is found by setting Φ(G(t)) = Γ(G(t)) whenever G(t)
is left-continuous; increasing rank payoﬀs ensures the convexity of Γ. When G jumps
from g to h, there is a linear segment in Γ with endpoints (g,Φ(g)) and (h,Φ(h)); the
slope of this segment coincides with the atomic payoﬀ, by Lemma 2. Since atomic and
non-atomic payoﬀs coincide in equilibrium, the slopes at the end points coincide, and Γ
is diﬀerentiable.
The equivalence lemma is important because it identiﬁes which game fundamentals
matter for the equilibrium analysis. For instance, costs can only speed up or slow down
play. We can henceforth employ potential functions to prove theorems by alluding to
geometric or graphical properties of the potential function.




















Figure 2: Examples 1 and 2 from Section 3: Caller 2 of 3 and U-Shaped Rank Payoﬀs.
The top left panel depicts the expected rank and expected atomic rank payoﬀs φ(g) and Λ(g,1) for the
Caller 2 of 3 game. The top right panel plots the running integral of payoﬀs Φ and the potential function
vex(Φ) identiﬁed in the existence Theorem 1. For the U-shaped example, the bottom left ﬁgure plots φ
and Λ(0,g) and the bottom right ﬁgure plots Φ and the unique potential function vex(Φ). The plots also
illustrate the theorems later on: Both examples attain the upper bound number two of phases (Theorem
2). Consistent with Theorem 3, the war of attrition is truncated in each case. Just as in Theorem 4,
there are two equilibria in the top game (the potential function for the unit jump is not drawn), and one
in the bottom game.
Example 1: Caller Number Two of Three. Assume N+1 = 3 and v = (0,1,0).
Then φ(g) = 2g(1−g) and Φ(g) = g2(1−2g/3). There are exactly two potential functions:
First, Γ may initially equal Φ, so that Γ1(g) = Φ(g) for g ≤ 1/4 and Γ1(g) = 3g/8−1/24
for g > 1/4. Second, Γ may be initially linear, whereupon it remains linear on [0,1],
by convexity, diﬀerentiability and (P3): Γ2(g) = g/3. These obey the key properties of
smoothness, convexity and boundary values: e.g. Γ′
2(1) = 1/3 > Φ′(1) = 0.
Assume delay costs c(t) = t and no discounting. This determines the speed: The
ﬁrst equilibrium involves smooth play described by the ODE 0 = −1 + 2 ˙ G(t)(1 − 2G(t))
from (3), with solution G(t) = 1/2−1/2
√
1 − 2t until G(t) = 1/4. At that point t = 1/4,
a jump to G = 1 occurs. The second equilibrium entails simply a time-0 jump to G = 1.
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vex(Φ)
Φ
Figure 3: Ironing φ. The left panel illustrates the ironing procedure on φ, the right panel depicts
both Φ and the convex hull of Φ, called vex(Φ).
Example 2: U-Shaped Rank Payoffs. Assume N +1 = 3 and v = (1,0,1). Then
φ(g) = (1 − g)2 + g2 and Φ(g) = g(1 + g(2g/3 − 1)). Here there is a unique potential
function Γ3(g) = 5g/8 for g ≤ 3/4 and Γ3(g) = Φ(g) for g > 3/4. Next, solving (3) yields
0 = −1+2 ˙ G(t)(2G(t)−1), with solution 2G(t) = 1+
p
1/4 + 2t. Continuous play begins
at t = 0, with G(0) = 3/4. Figure 2 illustrates both examples.
In mechanism design problems, non-monotonic payoﬀ functions are often “ironed” to
produce a monotonic function (e.g. Baron and Myerson (1982)). Namely, let vex(Φ) be
the convex hull of Φ, i.e. the largest convex function with vex(Φ)(g) ≤ Φ(g) for every g.
The “ironed” function then is the derivative vex(Φ)′(g) (see Figure 3). Our potential
functions follow a similar idea. Since exogenous costs are ever-increasing, the expected
rank-payoﬀs must also be increasing. Function φ, however, may decline, and these non-
monotonicities must be ironed away. Our potential function describes exactly how this
works: its derivative is the rank payoﬀ, its convexity ensures that equilibrium payoﬀs in-
crease. If the potential function contains a linear segment, then rank payoﬀs are constant,
and since delay is costly, atomic stopping must occur.
Theorem 1 A symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium exists and ends in ﬁnite time.
Proof: First, vex(Φ) exists, is a potential function, and thus induces an equilibrium.
In any equilibrium, payoﬀs are constant on the support at φ(0). So there exists ˜ t < ∞
with maxg e−rt[φ(g) − c(t)] < φ(0) after ˜ t. Delaying beyond ˜ t is a dominated strategy, as
rewards are discounted or eaten by exogenous delay costs, given limt→∞ c(t) = ∞. ￿
In the Caller Number Two of Three example, vex(Φ)(g) = Γ1(g). In the U-shape
example, Γ3(g) is the unique potential function, and therefore coincides with vex(Φ)(g).
12 Caller Number Five4 Behavioral Properties of Equilibria
4.1 Phases and Phases Transitions
We ﬁrst bound the number of slope-sign changes of the expected rank rewards. Deﬁne the
sign variation SV(γ) of the sequence γ = {γ0,γ1,...,γn} as the number of sign changes
left to right (zero terms being neglected). Analogously deﬁne the sign variation SV(f)
of the bounded function f : [0,1] → R, i.e. SV(f) = supn SV({f(t0),...,f(tn)}) where
0 ≤ t0 < t1 < ... < tn ≤ 1. Denote by ∆v(k) = v(k + 1) − v(k) the slope of v(k) at rank
k and ﬁnally put ∆v := {∆v(1),...,∆v(N)}.
Lemma 4 (Variation Diminishing Property of Expected Rank Rewards)
The slope sign variations are ranked SV(∆v) ≥ SV(φ′), and SV(∆v)−SV(φ′) is an even
number. Further, the signs of the ﬁrst and last slopes of v and φ coincide.
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Obviously, P(z(g)) and φ′(g) enjoy the same number of sign variations, i.e. positive real
roots of P. By Descartes’ Rule of Sign, this number is at most the number of sign changes
of its coeﬃcients a0,a1,...,aN. Also, if smaller, it is smaller by a multiple of 2. Thus
SV(∆v) ≥ SV(φ′) and SV(∆v) − SV(φ′) is even.
Finally, φ′(0) = ∆v(1) and φ′(1) = ∆v(N), proving the last clause. ￿
As noted earlier, this paper subsumes and extends two classes of standard timing
games: In a war of attrition, an exogenous delay cost opposes a strategic incentive to
outwait others. The reverse holds in a pre-emption game, where delay is exogenously
beneﬁcial, and players wish to pre-empt others. We now categorize game phases by
their strategic incentives. There is a war of attrition phase if ˙ G(t+) > 0 exists and
φ′(G(t+)) > 0 on (t,¯ t). A pre-emptive explosion obtains if G jumps at t, as G(t) > G(t−).
A phase transition occurs at some time t if two distinct timing games obtain in every
neighborhood of t. If three game phases obtain, then there are two phase transitions at t.
13 Caller Number FiveIn what follows, we shall drop the term ‘phase’ from the game descriptions.
Theorem 2 (Phase Transitions)
(a) Equilibrium play consists solely of an alternating sequence of at most SV(∆v) + 1
wars of attrition and pre-emptive explosions. There are no slow pre-emption games, and
pre-emptive atoms always subsume the portions of the domain on which φ is decreasing.
(b) If φ has m alternating slope signs, then SV(φ′) = m − 1 and the maximal number of
phase transitions is m−1. This bound is attained in equilibrium iﬀ vex(Φ) touches every
convex portion of Φ.
Theorem 2 implies that there are no slow pre-emption game phases.12 Intuitively, we only
assume exogenous costs of delay, and no beneﬁts, and thus there can be no opposition of
strategic costs of delay and exogenous beneﬁts.
Proof of (a): Expected payoﬀs are constant along the support of play. Delay is exoge-
nously costly, and so a player’s expected rank reward payoﬀ rises over time in equilibrium.
If ever φ′ < 0 on a segment of the support [0,1], then players must stop since delay is both
strategically and exogenously costly. So play involves slow war of attrition phases and
pre-emptive explosions. The number of times that φ′ switches from positive to negative is
bounded by SV(∆v) because φ cannot have more interior extrema than v, by Lemma 4.
The number of alternating phases is thus the number of switches plus one.
Proof of (b): A phase transition occurs iﬀ Γ switches from locally linear to strictly
convex or vice versa (Γ′′ > 0). The smooth Γ only changes slope when Γ = Φ. As a
non-linear polynomial, Φ has at most as many strictly convex portions as Γ, with equality
iﬀ (⋆): Γ touches each convex portion of Φ. As vex(Φ) is a potential function, this proves
suﬃciency. Next, assume (⋆). The smooth Γ includes the unique supporting tangent line
between all consecutive convex portions. The unique such potential function is vex(Φ). ￿
One can show that the maximum number of phase transitions is attained only if both
the sequence of minima of Λ(0,g) and the sequence of maxima of Λ(g,1) are increasing.
Example 3: Zick-Zack. The left panel of Figure 4 depicts the four player game
Zick-Zack, with rank rewards v = (0,ψ,0,1), with ψ > 0. Then
φ(g) = 3g(1 − g)
2   ψ + g
3   1 and φ
′(g) = 3ψ(2g − 1)




1/4 (1 − (1 − g)
4) − g(1 − g)
3￿
  ψ + g
4/4.
12Formally, a slow pre-emption game phase obtains if ˙ G(t+) > 0 exists and φ′(G(t+)) < 0 on (t,¯ t).
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Figure 4: The Zick-Zack Game: In this merger of examples 1 and 2, rank payoﬀs now twice change
slope, as v = (0,ψ,0,1). If v(2) = ψ (oﬀ the graph) is large enough, then the expected rank reward φ
likewise has both a hill and a valley. Otherwise, φ is monotonically increasing. The middle panel plots the
expected reward function φ and reward functions for initial atoms, Λ(0,g) and terminal atoms Λ(g,1).
The right panel plots Φ(g) and vex(Φ)(g).
Analyzing φ(g), one can see that φ(g) is monotonic for ψ ≤ 1 =: ψ, even though the
underlying rank reward structure v has two slope-sign changes. This illustrates the strict
inequality in Lemma 4, by a multiple of two. Then Φ is convex with the unique potential
function Φ = vex(Φ); thus there are no phase transitions (Theorem 2 (a)).
If ψ > ψ, then φ has two slope-sign-changes, like v. The fourth degree polynomial
Φ thus has two points of inﬂection, and vex(Φ) must contain at least one linear portion.
Hence, there can be at most two phase transitions (Theorem 2 (a)).
Next, vex(Φ) touches both the ﬁrst and second convex portions of Φ for ψ ≤ ψ ≤ ¯ ψ :=
(5 +
√
33)/4. By Theorem 2 (b), the associated equilibrium has the maximum number of
phase transitions (two): war of attrition, pre-emptive atom, and then war of attrition.
We have shown that φ smoothes out rank payoﬀs relative to v, reducing the number
of possible phase transitions below that suggested by a simple examination of the rank
payoﬀs v. Next, one could na¨ ıvely imagine that each slope sign change of the smooth
function φ initiates a phase transition. The na¨ ıve equilibrium would be one where a war
of attrition obtains iﬀ φ′ > 0 and a pre-emption game obtains iﬀ φ′ < 0. This is not what
happens in equilibrium. First of all, while φ may be non-monotonic, the only equilibrium
may well be a unique pre-emptive atom — for instance, with v = (2,0,1). More subtly,
the slope φ′ does not by itself determine the current timing game, because the relation of
marginal and average rewards, φ and Λ, is critical. Pre-emptive atoms subsume intervals
when φ is decreasing, by Theorem 2-(a); hence the atom is larger than necessary to reach
a level of G so that φ′ > 0; we thus say that the atom is ‘inﬂated’ relative to an atom that
would be prescribed by the na¨ ıve direct-sum. The reverse, i.e. inﬂation of war of attrition
phases, does not occur, as we now ﬂesh out.
15 Caller Number FiveTheorem 3 (Truncation and Atom-Inﬂation) Pre-emptive atoms are inﬂated and
wars of attrition truncated: Any pre-emptive atom subsumes at least some portion of
the adjacent intervals where φ is increasing, and where a war of attrition is played.
Proof: A linear portion of a potential function Γ must be a common tangent to distinct
convex portions of Φ, and corresponds to a pre-emptive explosion. If this tangent joins
non-adjacent convex portions, then the atom is strictly inﬂated, as it subsumes at least
one entire war of attrition phase. It therefore suﬃces to consider a common tangent τ of
adjacent convex portions. Without inﬂation, such τ must touch at consecutive points of
inﬂection of Φ, i.e. where φ′(g) = 0. This is impossible, as it would slice through Φ. ￿
For instance, in the Caller Number Two of Three example, at most one phase transition
occurs, since φ′ changes its sign just once, from positive to negative when g = 1/2. Observe
that the ODE deﬁning the war of attrition is deﬁned until time t = 1/2. While this may
be its natural termination point, terminal atomic rewards are too small at that moment.
Indeed, the atom would have size G(1/2) = 1/2, and Λ(1/2,1) = 1/3 < φ(1/2) = 1/2.
Hence, the atom must be for smaller g, whence φ(g) and Λ(g,1) cross. This occurs
when Λ(g,1) has a maximum at g = 1/4, i.e. G(3/8) = 1/4. This is before time t = 1/2,
hence truncation.
4.2 The Number of Equilibria
We now ﬁnd that the number of equilibria is potentially quite large — about two raised
to the number of phase transitions. Speciﬁcally, let Em denote the set of symmetric Nash
equilibria, where m is the number of alternating slope signs of φ. Given the expected
rank rewards φ, we can tie down the maximal cardinality of Em.13
Theorem 4 (How many equilibria?)
Assume φ has exactly m alternating slope-signs. Then the maximum number of equilibria
|Em| is 2|Jm|, where Jm is the set of up-slopes of φ followed by down-slopes.
Proof: An equilibrium implies a unique set of up-slopes played (the common tangent
on pairs of strictly convex portions of Φ is unique). Indeed, an initial down-slope prior
to Jm does not aﬀect the number of equilibria, as the down-slope is skipped in a jump.
A terminal up-slope likewise does not aﬀect the number of equilibria. It will either be
skipped by a pre-emptive atom or played in a war of attrition, but not both. So there
is a 1-1 map from equilibria Em to sets Jm — hence, the power set enumeration for the
upper bound of |Em|. ￿
13For a recent contribution on the number of NE in Normal form games see McLennan (2005).
16 Caller Number FiveThe number of slopes m (up-down-...or down-up-...) is either odd or even. Suppose
φ slopes up at g = 0. We then have to ﬁnd the number of up-slopes followed by down-
slopes: if m is even, this number k satisﬁes m = 2k; if m is odd then m = 2k + 1.
The theorem states that the maximal number of equilibria is |E2k|,|E2k+1|≤2k. Likewise,
if φ slopes down at g = 0, then when m is odd, the number of up-slopes followed by
down-slopes satisﬁes m = 2k − 1 so that |E2k−1|,|E2k|≤2k−1.
For instance, the standard war of attrition has one slope-sign, and thus has |E2 0+1| =
20 = 1 equilibrium. The U-shaped game has two slopes, but slopes down ﬁrst, so that
it has at most |E2 1| = 21−1 = 1 equilibrium. Caller Number Two of Three has m = 2
slopes, and exactly one up-slope followed by a down-slope, so that there are maximally
|E2 1| = 21 equilibria.
For Zick-Zack, the theorem asserts that the terminal up-slope should not aﬀect the
maximum number of equilibria, i.e. still |E2 1+1| ≤ 21. Why? Clearly, if ψ ≤ 1, then the
unique equilibrium is a war of attrition. If ψ > 1, then Φ has two points of inﬂection,
and there are three possible potential functions: The ﬁrst begins with a linear segment
τ0 that touches the second convex portion of Φ and is then strictly convex. The second
is strictly convex, ending with a linear portion through (1,Φ(1)). This linear segment
τ1 is tangent to the ﬁrst convex portion of Φ and must have slope Γ′(1) ≥ Φ′(1). The
last potential function has a linear segment τ in the interior of [0,1] which is the unique
common tangent to the ﬁrst and second convex portions of Φ.
By construction, each of these potential functions is unique — if it exists. Observe
that the tangent τ necessarily ﬁrst touches Φ at some g ∈ (0,1), because Φ′(0) = φ(0) =
0 < φ(g) = Φ′(g) for g > 0. However, its second touch point occurs at some interior h < 1
only in some conditions, namely iﬀ ψ ∈ [ψ , ¯ ψ). Moreover, as is geometrically clear, the
tangents τ and τ1 coincide at the very moment that ψ = ¯ ψ. The tangent τ1 in fact exists
for ψ ≥ ψ
1 := (11+3
√
17)/16. But its slope only weakly exceeds Φ′(1) for ψ ≥ ¯ ψ, where
¯ ψ > ψ
1. Altogether, τ1 is part of a potential function iﬀ ψ ≥ ¯ ψ.
This illustrates why the terminal up-slope in Zick-Zack does not increase the number
of equilibria relative to the Caller Number Two of Three game: tangent τ1 represents a
terminal atom skipping the last up-slope, while τ corresponds to an interior atom after
which the terminal up-slope is played. Precisely one of the two obtains.
One can ﬁnally show that the initial tangent τ0 exists for 9/5 := ψ
0 ≤ ψ ≤ 3 := ¯ ψ0.
For ψ > ¯ ψ0, τ0 is no longer tangent to the second convex portion of Φ. For when ψ = ¯ ψ0,
τ0 becomes a straight line from the origin to (1,Φ(1)) corresponding to a time zero unit
17 Caller Number Fiveatom. In summary, the maximum number of equilibria (two) is attained iﬀ ψ ≥ ψ
0.14
When is the maximum number of equilibria attained?15 One may be tempted to think
it suﬃcient that vex(Φ) touches all convex portions of Φ, as in Theorem 2-(b). But the
above analysis of Zick-Zack shows that this is not enough: For ψ ∈ [ψ,ψ
0), vex(Φ) touches
both convex portions of Φ, and yet the induced equilibrium is unique.
Even when the maximal number of equilibria is attained, no equilibrium need attain
the maximal number of phase transitions. In Zick-Zack, both equilibria have only one
phase transition for ψ > ¯ ψ, while the most phase transitions is two, by Theorem 2-(a).
So how does one ﬁnd all the equilibria? First, one identiﬁes all convex portions of Φ.
Next, one determines all possible pairwise connections between these convex portions;
these are the lines that are tangent to two such portions. For each non-overlapping
combination of these lines, one veriﬁes whether convexity is preserved, i.e. the slopes of
these lines are successively increasing. Then one combines all such feasible combinations
of linear segments with the adjacent smooth, convex portions of Φ so that the combination
spans the entire domain [0,1]. Ensuring each time that (P1) is satisﬁed ﬁnally yields the
potential functions that induce the equilibria.
5 Equilibrium Payoﬀs
Our analysis using potential functions allows us to see how the qualitative features of
equilibrium play depend separately on time costs and rank rewards. This dichotomy is
the essential reason for the simplicity of our analysis: The size and location of atoms in
probability space owes to rank payoﬀs, while the speed of wars of attrition depends on
the time cost of delay. Theorem 5 illustrates this insight in the context of total welfare.
We now ask what is each player’s expected payoﬀ, and how much “rent” is lost by
delay? In the unobserved actions pure war of attrition, the (common) expected payoﬀ is
the initial rank reward φ(0) = v(1), and all rents are dissipated, namely the diﬀerence
φ(1) − φ(0) = v(N + 1) − v(1) between highest and lowest rank payoﬀs — the total
variation in rank payoﬀs. But with non-monotonic rank payoﬀs, the total variation of
rank-payoﬀs is no longer the tightest bound on payoﬀ dissipation.
14The ψ
0,ψ
1 thresholds are most easily obtained via Λ(0,g) and Λ(g,1): First, Λ(0,g) has an interior
maximum and minimum for all ψ ≥ ψ
0, and is monotonic for smaller ψ. If a potential function starts
with a linear portion, then τ0 is tangent to Φ(g) exactly when φ(g) and Λ(0,g) intersect at an interior
minimum of Λ(0,g). The middle panel of Figure 4 illustrates this point. The threshold ¯ ψ0 for ψ allows
φ(g) and Λ(0,g) to cross at g = 1. The computations for ψ
1 follow similar lines of reasoning using
Λ(g,1). Finally, the payoﬀ from the interior maximum of Λ(g,1) coincides with φ(1) at ¯ ψ.
15Detailed suﬃcient conditions for this are available from the authors upon request.
18 Caller Number FiveTo make simple statements about expected payoﬀs, we next make a simple assumption
about delay costs. We assume no discounting and constant marginal participation costs,
c(t) = t, so that rent dissipation coincides with the length of the play.
Theorem 5 (Payoﬀs) Assume no discounting and linear participation costs c(t) = t.
(a) Fix an equilibrium corresponding to a given potential function Γ. Then the expected
payoﬀ is Γ′(0), and the game must end after an elapse time of Γ′(1) − Γ′(0).
(b) The equilibrium with the least expected payoﬀ and maximal length corresponds to
vex(Φ). Thus, the least value is vex(Φ)′(0), and the greatest length is vex(Φ)′(1)−vex(Φ)′(0).
For a given potential function, the equilibrium expected payoﬀ of the game is a local
minimum of the forward looking average rewards; the game lasts until a local maximum
of backward average rewards obtains. Moreover, the least expected payoﬀ of the game is
the global minimum of the forward average payoﬀs, and the maximal time elapse likewise
occurs when the global maximum backward average rewards are reached.
Proof of (a): Fix a potential function Γ. Since the mixed strategy ensures a constant
payoﬀ along the support of play, the expected payoﬀ of the game is the time zero payoﬀ
Γ′(0). By Theorem 1 the game ends in ﬁnite time. The length of play depends on the
payoﬀs dissipated — the higher the payoﬀ they can obtain, the longer people are willing
to delay. Since expected rank-payoﬀs must increase along the support of play, the largest
rank-payoﬀ Γ′(1) obtains when the game ends.
Proof of (b): Suppose, counterfactually, that Γ′(0) < vex(Φ)′(0) for some potential
function Γ. Since vex(Φ) ≤ Φ everywhere, we have vex(Φ)′(0) ≤ Φ′(0), and thus Γ′(0) <
Φ′(0). Then Γ is initially linear by (P3). But diﬀerentiability and (P3) jointly imply
that Γ can only change slopes while tangent to Φ. If this happens at g ∈ (0,1), then
vex(Φ)(g) ≤ Φ(g) = Γ(g) = Γ′(0)g < vex(Φ)′(0)g. This violates convexity of vex(Φ).
Similarly, at g = 1 we have Γ′(1) ≤ vex(Φ)′(1) for any potential function Γ. ￿
This result extends the standard war of attrition with monotonic rank rewards: When
φ is monotonic, Φ is globally convex, and the only potential function is Φ itself. The
expected payoﬀ is Φ′(0) = φ(0) = v(1), and the maximal length is Φ′(1) − Φ′(0) =
φ(1) − φ(0) = v(N + 1) − v(1). In fact, by (P3) and Theorem 5-(b), this is the length of
any unobserved actions game where vex(Φ) begins and ends on a strictly convex portion.
Since rank payoﬀs are smoothed in φ with unobserved actions, the total variation in
φ = Φ′ is a tighter upper bound on payoﬀ dissipation (eg. Figure 4, left). But war of
attrition-phases are truncated, and even this measure is not tight enough. The length
and expected payoﬀ depend on the slopes of the initial and terminal tangents τ0 and τ1.
19 Caller Number FiveIn Caller Number Two of Three, vex(Φ) is strictly convex for g ≤ 1/4 and linear with
slope 3/8 for g > 1/4. The expected payoﬀ is φ(0) = 0 and the maximum length of
the game is 3/8. In the U-shaped example, vex(Φ) is linear with slope 5/8 for g < 3/4
and strictly convex for g ≥ 3/4. The expected payoﬀ in the game is the ﬁrst expected
rank payoﬀ in the war of attrition, φ(3/4) = 5/8, and the maximum elapse time equals
φ(1) − φ(3/4) = 3/8.
In Zick-Zack, with rank rewards (0,ψ,0,1), vex(Φ) is the potential function that starts
with a strictly convex portion. Thus, the minimum expected rank payoﬀ is φ(0) = 0. For
ψ ≤ ψ, Φ is strictly convex, and the unobserved actions game is then equivalent to
a war of attrition. If ψ ∈ (ψ, ¯ ψ), vex(Φ) touches both convex portions of Φ and hence
vex(Φ)′(0) = φ(0) and vex(Φ)′(1) = φ(1). Thus, the maximum duration is φ(1)−φ(0) = 1,
which is below the total variation ψ in rank payoﬀs. Finally, for ψ > ¯ ψ, vex(Φ) ends with
a linear portion, and the terminal payoﬀ is governed by the slope of the tangent τ1. The
maximum duration exceeds φ(1) − φ(0), but is still less than the total variation of φ.
More generally, the equilibrium payoﬀ is unaﬀected by the speciﬁcs of the cost func-
tion or the discount rate — and is still Γ′(0), as in Theorem 5. Rent dissipation Γ′(1)
determines the length of play, i.e. t solves e−rt[Γ′(1)−c(t)] = Γ′(0). The solution is unique
since ˙ c > 0. In other words, Theorem 5 is immediately amenable to applications with a
nonconstant cost function c(t) or discounting.
What about the most eﬃcient equilibrium? If Φ(1) ≥ Φ′(1), then Γ∗(p) = pΦ(1) is
a potential function, and clearly corresponds to a time-0 complete atom. But if Φ(1) <
Φ′(1), then a time-0 jump is no longer an equilibrium. In some of these cases, we can
identify the most eﬃcient equilibrium, but we have found no clear theorem. For there are
examples where the equilibrium with the greatest expected payoﬀ is not the quickest.
Assuming that Φ′′(1−) = φ′(1−) > 0, for instance, if we can construct a tangent τ∗
from the origin to the last convex portion of Φ, tangent at some ¯ p ∈ (0,1], then it is
the most eﬃcient equilibrium by both measures: shortest and greatest expected payoﬀ.
The shortest equilibrium in Zick-Zack is induced by the potential function Γ with a linear
segment at the origin; such a potential function exists when ψ ≥ ψ
0. Since Γ  = vex(Φ), its
expected payoﬀ is higher. Also, for ψ < ¯ ψ0, its terminal slope is Γ′(1) = Φ′(1) = φ(1) = 1,
which is weakly smaller than vex(Φ)′(1). Thus, it is the shortest equilibrium. For ψ ≥ ¯ ψ0,
the atom is complete; this equilibrium is the shortest with the maximal expected payoﬀ.
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The timing game literature has long partitioned into wars of attrition and pre-emption
games. The incentive structure for both varieties of timing games ﬁnds a common home in
this paper. This paper introduces the idea of potential functions into this class of timing
games, using them to characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria. This has aﬀorded a
quick existence proof, and tractable analysis of these equilibria. The resulting equilibria
are rich, with interior atomic explosions that may be preceded or followed by slow wars
of attrition. Further, the two types of timing games interact with each other, with antici-
pation of later phases inﬂuencing current play. Thus, the moments for the explosions are
advanced in time relative to a na¨ ıve “direct sum”.
Two extensions of our work come to mind: Exogenous payoﬀ growth over time and
observed actions. We pursue the former in other work and in Appendix A, we brieﬂy
argue that our insights extend to observable actions.
A Appendix: Lessons for Observable Actions
Once actions are observed, the model grows substantially more complex. Subgame-perfect
equilibrium (SPE) is the mandated solution concept. Since players can see the game
unfolding, there are now multiple information sets, one for each number of remaining
players. There are therefore far more equilibria, since the number of remaining players
itself can serve as a coordination device. We shall thus conﬁne attention to symmetric SPE
for which players engage in a war of attrition whenever possible, and a pre-emption game
only when necessary. This substitutes for the stationarity condition for Nash equilibrium.
For intuitively, a pre-emptive atom requires a high degree of coordination, and a war of
attrition needs no coordination at all. Despite this reﬁnement which seeks to minimize the
role of pre-emption games, we now argue that our main qualitative ﬁnding still obtains:
wars of attrition are truncated, and pre-emption atoms inﬂated.
Let w(k + 1) be the expected SPE payoﬀ from the subgame after k have stopped.
Lemma 5 A war of attrition obtains if v(k +1) < w(k +2) while a pre-emptive atom of
some size p ∈ (0,1] occurs if v(k + 1) ≥ w(k + 2).
Proof: Any p < 1 must equate the expected rank payoﬀs from the continuation game



















21 Caller Number FiveNow, the LHS of (5) is ﬂatter than the RHS of (5) at p = 0. For comparing slopes yields:
(N−k)(v(k+2)−v(k+1))/2+(N−k)(w(k+2)−v(k+1)) < (N−k)(v(k+2)−v(k+1))/2
since w(k+2)−v(k+1) < 0. Both sides are continuous in p and coincide for p = 0. Thus,
they either intersect again for some p ≤ 1, or, if not, the RHS atomic payoﬀ dominates
the LHS continuation payoﬀ for all p, and a complete atom must obtain. ￿
Assuming again a constant cost of delay c(t) = t, the expected length of the war is
w(k + 2) − v(k + 1), while its expected payoﬀ is v(k + 1) =: w(k + 1). Assume that rank
payoﬀs rise from j to k. We say that a war of attrition is truncated in time if its expected
duration is less than v(k) − v(j). Call a war of attrition weakly truncated (i.e. in ranks)
if it nowhere obtains in {j,...,k}, or if it obtains from j′ to k′ for some j ≤ j′ < k′ ≤ k.
Likewise, if rank payoﬀs fall from j to k, the pre-emption game is weakly inﬂated (in
ranks) if it obtains from j′ to k′ for some j′ ≤ j and k′ ≥ k. Once an atom occurs, there
is further atomic stopping until a war of attrition-subgame is reached.
(♦) All rank payoﬀs on down-slopes are more valuable than the overall average remaining
payoﬀ, or v(k + 1) > A(k,N − k) whenever v(k + 1) < v(k), for any k.
Theorem 6 Assume (♦). Wars of attrition are truncated in time, weakly truncated in
ranks and pre-emptive atoms are weakly inﬂated.
Proof: As players are symmetric, they cannot expect to gain more than the average
remaining rank payoﬀ, w(k + 1) ≤ A(k,N − k). So (♦) implies v(k + 1) > w(k + 1).
A war of attrition along an up-slope from a minimum rank k to ¯ k lasts at most time
w(¯ k)−v(k); it is thus truncated in the time dimension from the na¨ ıve length v(¯ k)−v(k).
Atomic stopping obtains whenever v(k) > w(k+1). Assume that there are subsequent
up-slopes of rank-rewards. If the atom is complete, then it is clearly inﬂated. If the atom
is incomplete, then with positive probability play continues on the same down-slope. But
then v(k) > v(k + 1) > w(k + 1), and another atom follows immediately. So once atomic
stopping starts, it stops only when play begins weakly on an up-slope. ￿
Corollary Assume (♦). The lowest expected equilibrium payoﬀ with unobservable ac-
tions, vex′(Φ)(0), is a lower bound for the expected payoﬀ in an observable actions setting.
This corollary can, of course, also be applied to every subgame of the observable actions
setting, where vex′(Φ)(0) is to be computed for the unobservable actions game with N +
1 − k players. The corollary is a direct consequence of vex′(Φ)(0) constituting a global
minimum of the right hand side of equation (5). It is not true, however, that vex(Φ)′(1)−
22 Caller Number Fivevex(Φ)′(0) is some kind of bound on the elapse time: this is due to the fact that rank
payoﬀs become left truncated as people stop. Hence vex(Φ)′(1) has no direct counterpart
relation in a setting with observable actions.
Corollary Assume (♦). There are at most as many phases as slope signs of v(k).
B Appendix: Other Nash Equilibria
Assumption (E1) restricts the set of equilibria we consider. We now argue that relaxing
either of the restrictions of (E1) introduces a continuum of other equilibria.
If we drop the assumption that 0 belongs to the support, then a continuum of equilibria
may arise as follows:16 Suppose that in the set of equilibria that we identify there is one
with an atom at time zero and Γ′(0) > φ(0), as occurs in Caller 2 of 3. Then there is
a maximum time t such that e−rt [Γ′(0) − c(t)] = φ(0). And for every s ∈ (0,t], play
according to Γ starting at time s is an equilibrium.
Similarly, if we abandon the requirement of a convex support, then a continuum of
equilibria can be constructed: The idea behind such a construction is to have an atom
from g to h that pays more than expected rank payoﬀs φ(g). To make this an equilibrium,
the beneﬁts of the atom must be destroyed (because payoﬀs in a mixed strategy must be
constant on the support). In our setting this payoﬀ destruction is achieved by prescribing
suﬃcient delay (which is costly) until the atom occurs. (And pre-empting such an atom
does not pay precisely because the rank payoﬀ from pre-emption, φ(g), is smaller than the
atomic payoﬀ.) Economically, these kinds of atom require implicit sunspot coordination,
and for this reason we believe that these equilibria are very unappealing.
More elaborately, one way to construct a continuum of equilibria in absence of the
convex support assumption goes as follows: suppose that Γ prescribes an atom at time ti
from ξi to ξi+1, and G(ti) = ξi. Also assume ξi+1 < 1, i.e. the atom is not termi-
nal. Now pick a small ǫ > 0, and compute G(t∗ − ǫ) =: ξ
−ǫ
i < ξi. Let ξ
−ǫ
i+1 < ξi+2






i+1) > φ(ξi+1) (since the atom at ξi is not ter-
minal, for small enough ǫ such a ξ
+ǫ
i+1 ∈ (ξi+1,ξi+2) exists by Lemma 4). Finally let
δ solve e−r(ti−ǫ) ￿
φ(ξ
−ǫ





i+1) − c(ti + δ)
￿
. Such a δ exists be-
cause φ(ξ
−ǫ
i ) < φ(ξ
+ǫ
i+1) and because e−r(t) ￿
φ(ξ
−ǫ
i ) − c(t)
￿
declines monotonically in t.
Then the following is an equilibrium: play Γ until time ti −ǫ; be inactive from ti −ǫ until




i at time ti+δ; play the portion of Γ that is deﬁned
16A related problem arises in all pay auctions; for details see Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996).
23 Caller Number Fivefor ξ ∈ [ξ
+ǫ
i+1,1] thereafter for t > ti + δ. Conceptually this equilibrium without a convex
support is ‘quite similar’ to the equilibrium that we specify with convex support.
C Appendix: Other Proofs
C.1 Equilibrium Structure: Proof of Lemma 1
Fix t in the interior of the support of G, and assume that G does not jump at t. Since
payoﬀs (2) are constant on the support, payoﬀ e−rt(φ(G(t))−c(t)) =: ψ > 0 is a constant
when G(t) < 1. But this forces G diﬀerentiable at t. Since φ is a degree N polynomial,
φ′ = 0 at most N − 1 times, between which φ′ is positive or negative. There are three
cases to consider.
Case 1. If φ′(G(t)) > 0 at t, then G is diﬀerentiable at t, with
˙ G(t) =
˙ c + r (φ(G(t)) − c)
φ′(G(t))
.
Case 2. If φ′(G(t)) < 0 at t, then φ(G(t) − ǫ) > φ(G(t)) > φ(G(t) + ǫ) for all small
enough ǫ > 0. Since t is inside the support of G, but is not in an atom, there exists
δ > 0 with φ(G(t) − ǫ) > φ(G(t − δ)) > φ(G(t)) > φ(G(t + δ)) > φ(G(t) + ǫ). Since
e−r(t−δ) > e−rt and c(t − δ) < c(t), a constant payoﬀ is impossible because
e
−r(t−δ)(φ(G(t − δ)) − c(t − δ)) > e
−rt(φ(G(t)) − c(t)).
In other words, φ′(G(t)) < 0 cannot obtain in equilibrium.
Case 3. Suppose φ′(G(t)) = 0 at t. If this is a saddle point with φ′ < 0 left and right
of G(t), then G(t) = φ−1(c(t)+ertψ) locally. But this is decreasing, and so not a solution.
Otherwise, φ′ > 0 is increasing on at least one side of G(t), where G(t) = φ−1(c(t)+ertψ)
locally describes the unique smooth solution of the ODE.
Finally, if t = 0 or if the support interval of G is [0,t], then the argument that G is
diﬀerentiable (right or left, respectively) is a slight modiﬁcation of the above analysis.
C.2 Relation of Atomic and Expected Rewards: Proof of Lemma 2
We will show that φ(h) − Λ(g,h) = (h − g) ∂
∂hΛ(g,h); the result from the Lemma follows
by integrating this relation from g to h. We will show the claim directly by algebraic










































































































ρ(k,j,g,h)v(k + 1 + j) +
N X
k=0







ρ(k,j,g,h)v(k + 1 + j) − Λ(g,h).


















ρ(k,j,g,h)v(k + 1 + j). (6)
Fix v(k +1) and collect all terms on the right hand side that contain v(k +1). These are
for i from 0 to k and j = k − i. Thus
k X
i=0
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25 Caller Number FiveC.3 Potential Function Equivalence: Proof of Lemma 3
Fix a potential function Γ. By (P1) it is convex, and so there are at most countably many
intervals on which it is linear. Consider any such interval [ν,ξ]. First, Γ(ν) = Φ(ν), by









Γ′(ξ) = Φ′(ξ) if ξ < 1
Γ′(ν) = Φ′(ν) if ν > 0
So (E2) obtains: Stoppers earn identical payoﬀs just before atomic stopping if ν > 0, for
then Λ(ν,ξ) equals Φ′(ν) = φ(ν), and after atomic stopping if ξ < 1, since Φ′(ξ) = φ(ξ).
Also, (E1) holds, as expected rank payoﬀs are positive, by Γ(ξ) > Γ(ν). If ξ = 1, then
φ(1) = Φ′(1) ≤ Γ′(1) = Λ(ν,1) by (P1); so (E3) holds.
Assume Γ = Φ on [ν,ξ], so that φ = Φ′ = Γ′ (which exists by (P2)). We then needn’t
worry about (E3). Since Γ is convex by (P2) and Φ is smooth, we have φ′ = Γ′′ ≥ 0.
Also, φ is strictly increasing inside the interval, being a nonconstant polynomial; thus,
(E1) holds, as φ′ can only initially vanish. Assume that G(t) = ν, for some t ≥ 0.
Thus, the ODE ˙ G = (˙ c+r[φ(G)−c])/φ′(G) in (3) admits the “constant payoﬀ” solution
e−rt[φ(G(t))−c(t)] = φ(0) = Γ′(0), which is the initial payoﬀ — recalling that the support
of G must includes. This gives (E2). Let C(t) := c(t) + ertΓ′(0). Since φ is strictly
increasing on (ν,ξ), G(t) = φ−1(C(t)) obtains on the domain (t,¯ t), where ¯ t = C−1(ξ).
Next, ﬁx an equilibrium G. Deﬁne the potential function Γ as follows: ﬁrst, Γ(g) =
Φ(g) whenever G is continuous at G−1(g); next, at any jump from g to h, Γ is the linear








≥ φ(h) with equality if h < 1
= φ(g) = Γ′(g) if g > 0
(7)
by constant payoﬀs (E2),(E3). This gives (P3) and also (P2): For Γ is increasing since
Γ′ = φ > 0 by (7), and convex: Γ is linear, or has slope φ, which is increasing by (E2).
Finally, we show (P1). If Γ = Φ near 1, then Γ(1) = Φ(1) and Γ′(1) = Φ′(1). If Γ = Φ
near 0, then Γ(0) = Φ(0). If G(t) starts with a jump from 0 to h, then Γ has a linear
segment with slope Φ(h)/h through (h,Φ(h)). This forces Γ(0) = 0. If G ends with a
jump to 1, then Γ′(1) is the ﬁnal linear slope, i.e. Γ′(1)≥φ(1)=Φ′(1) by (7). ￿
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